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Abstract
We study optimal contracting in team settings, featuring stylized aspects of production
environments with complex tasks. Agents have many opportunities to shirk, task-level monitoring is needed to provide useful incentives, and because it is diﬃcult to write individual
performance into formal contracts, incentives are provided informally, using wasteful sanctions like guilt and shame, or slowed promotion. ese features give rise to optimal contracts
with “empty promises” and endogenous supervision structures. Agents optimally make more
promises than they intend to keep, leading to the concentration of supervisory responsibility
in the hands of one or two agents.
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Introduction

Carol is Bob’s supervisor. Bob is capable of performing up to four complex tasks that bene t
both of them, but each task requires costly eﬀort to complete. When the time comes for Bob to
perform the tasks, he privately learns which of the tasks are feasible, and then privately decides
which feasible tasks he will complete and which ones he will shirk. At the end, Carol will monitor
Bob’s tasks. Upon nding that a task fails her inspection, however, she cannot tell whether the task
was infeasible or whether Bob intentionally shirked. e only instruments for motivating Bob are
sanctions that do not transfer utility to Carol; for instance, he can be reprimanded, demoted, or
red.¹
Should Bob always exert eﬀort on all his feasible tasks? Not if task feasibility is moderately
uncertain. en it is optimal for Bob to make “empty promises”, and for Carol to be “forgiving”
when she decides how much to sanction him. Empty promises arise, for example, when Bob is
assigned four tasks but completes at most two of them, regardless of how many are feasible. For
Bob to make those two empty promises, Carol should not sanction him unless three or more of
his tasks fail her inspection. Of course, if Bob is forgiven his rst two failures, he will have no
incentive to complete more than two of his tasks. But the likelihood that three or four of his tasks
will be feasible is not high, so the cost of two empty promises is small; and forgiving them saves
Bob from sanctions in the more likely event that two or fewer of his tasks are feasible. Empty
promises thus buﬀer against the sanctions Bob would incur when too few tasks are feasible. In
the presence of costly sanctions, it may be socially optimal for Carol to simply accept Bob’s empty
promises rather than force him to complete all his feasible tasks. Bob’s promises are “empty”
because it is commonly known that he will not complete them, even if they are feasible.
In this worker-supervisor arrangement, it is socially optimal for Bob to shirk some of his feasible tasks even though Carol is monitoring all of them. If Bob and Carol are each capable of
performing or monitoring up to four tasks, in total, then there are other arrangements under
which four promises are made and all of them are monitored. For example, they could each
promise two tasks and monitor the other’s two. Or Bob could promise one task and Carol could
promise three, with each monitoring all the promises of the other. Are all these arrangements
¹We assume task completion is not formally contractible, so that Carol cannot be legally bound to pay Bob a
bonus for completing tasks. If Carol and Bob are not very patient, then even in a relational contracts setting (e.g.,
Radner, 1985; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 1994; Che and Yoo, 2001; Levin, 2003; MacLeod, 2003) there is limited
scope for Carol to commit to discretionary bonuses or for Bob to commit to voluntary nes. Furthermore, even the
limited scope for such commitment may be needed to support other aspects of their relationship, such as investment
in human capital.
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welfare-equivalent? No—whenever it is optimal for anyone to make empty promises, the workersupervisor arrangement is strictly better than any mutual monitoring arrangement. So in the
optimal contract an endogenous supervisor emerges. is occurs due to the statistical complementarities arising when cutoﬀ strategies are used. If promise-keeping were optimal, it would
make no diﬀerence how supervisory responsibility is allocated.
Our task-based approach with peer monitoring and informal, wasteful sanctions ts some
stylized characteristics of an important class of partnership and team environments: those in
which production is complex and requires accumulated job-speci c human capital. According
to Lazear and Shaw (2007), from 1987 to 1996 “the percent of large rms with workers in selfmanaged work teams rose from 27 percent to 78 percent,” and moreover “the rms that use teams
the most are those that have complex problems to solve.” Similarly, Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw
(2007) nd that steel minimills with more complex production processes are more likely to organize workers into “problem-solving teams.” In such environments, agents face many opportunities
to shirk, rather than one or several. For instance, an agent may face numerous tasks in a single
workday, and yet output, being complex, may be measurable only weekly or monthly, as well as
noisy or hard to quantify. Task-level monitoring is needed to provide useful incentives, and monitoring the performance of complex tasks is diﬃcult for anyone who is not intimately familiar with
related tasks. One example is the shop oor of a prototypical Japanese manufacturing rm, on
which Aoki (1988, p. 15) writes,
e experience-based knowledge shared by a team of workers on the shop oor may
be tacit and not readily transferable in the form of formal language, but is quite useful
in identifying local emergencies, such as product defects and machine malfunctions,
on the spot and solving them autonomously. ose workers nurtured in a wide range
of [job-speci c] skills may be able to understand, as individuals or as a collective,
why defective products have increased, and may be able to devise and implement
measures to cope with the situation and thus prevent the problem from recurring.
is can be done without much, if any “outside” help…
Another is the shop oor of an American garment producer, where workers in teams “learned all
production tasks, had more information about production tasks, and … quickly caught quality
problems, which allowed the team to quickly identify and correct the source of quality problems”
(Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan, 2003, p. 477).
Finally, since the output of a specialist is hard to describe, it is hard to write performance-based
incentives at the individual level into a formal contract. Lacking the ability to enforce transfers
4

through a formal contract, the agents must provide individual-level incentives informally, using
wasteful instruments like guilt and shame (Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Barron and Gjerde, 1997;
Carpenter, Bowles, Gintis, and Hwang, 2009).² When extreme sanctions arise, typically the worst
available is separation, with its attendant search and dislocation costs. Aoki (1988, p. 58) writes
“unless the employee possesses special skills that might be needed elsewhere, the value of those
skills, accumulated in the context of teamwork and internal personal networking, would by and
large be lost”; moreover, “midcareer separation may signal negative attributes.”
In our example, if Bob and Carol are on a shop oor team, Bob’s complex tasks may be to
try to x small malfunctions in the production equipment in order to avoid introducing defects
into the product. A task is feasible if Bob is capable of xing the particular malfunction, but Bob
can also shirk the task by ignoring the malfunction. When Carol monitors Bob’s tasks, she can
observe whether a product is defective, but she cannot discern whether the defects arose from a
malfunction that Bob could have xed. To motivate Bob, if there are too many defects then Carol
can reprimand him in front of the other workers, and add demerits to his personnel le that will
slow his path of promotion through the rm or ultimately lead the rm to re him.
is paper ts into the theory literature on partnership and teams with moral hazard, but emphasizes a new perspective on teamwork. Inspired by complex production environments, where
output is hard to quantify and agents have built up specialized, job-speci c human capital, we
bring together three features: peer monitoring, high-dimensional eﬀort, and wasteful sanctions.
ese features provide the foundation for studying two important tradeoﬀs—between production
and monitoring, and between punishment and forgiveness—as well as the endogenous allocation
of monitoring responsibility. Much of the literature on teams addresses contracts that depend
on stochastic team output, and focuses on the problem of free-riding,³ or allows for exogenously
speci ed individual-level monitoring.⁴ In contrast, our approach endogenizes individual-level
monitoring by putting the agents in charge of monitoring each other. We assume that assigning

²Linear incentives based on team-level output merely amplify the social bene ts of task completion that are already
a primitive of our model. In Section 6 we study a rm that hires a team of agents, oﬀering them a formal contract that
is linear in team output in concert with an informal contract of wasteful sanctions. Because the formal contract cannot
distinguish among the tasks completed by diﬀerent agents, the rm optimally oﬀers a team-level output bonus that is
too small to solve the moral hazard problem.
³For example: Legros and Matsushima (1991); Legros and Matthews (1993); d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet
(1998); Battaglini (2006); Coviello, Ichino, and Persico (2011). Free riding, of course, also arises in public goods problems (e.g., Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1984).
⁴For example: Mirrlees (1976); Holmström (1982); Holmström and Milgrom (1991); McAfee and McMillan
(1991); Miller (1997); Che and Yoo (2001); Laux (2001); Kvaløy and Olsen (2006); Carpenter, Bowles, Gintis, and Hwang
(2009); Matsushima, Miyazaki, and Yagi (2010).
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an agent to monitor her peers crowds out her own productivity.⁵ is allows us to study the tradeoﬀ between productive and supervisory activity at both the individual level and the team level,
and to study the optimal assignment of agents into productive and supervisory roles.
Whereas the prior literature generally studies agents who exert eﬀort along one dimension
or several complementary dimensions,⁶ in our model each task constitutes an independent dimension of eﬀort.⁷ is assumption imposes a natural structure on the stochastic relationship
among eﬀort, output, and monitoring, and enables us to make more speci c predictions about
task completion and supervision than possible with a single dimension of continuous eﬀort.
Finally, a majority of the literature assumes that all incentives are provided through monetary
payments, such that only the imbalance must be burned (or given to a residual claimant).⁸ Instead, we rule out formal monetary transfers, and focus on providing incentives through informal
sanctions that are socially wasteful. Wasteful sanctions are also studied by Kandel and Lazear
(1992); Barron and Gjerde (1997); Che and Yoo (2001); Carpenter, Bowles, Gintis, and Hwang
(2009) in diﬀerent settings. eoretically, a framework with sanctions may be interpreted as the
reduced-form of a repeated game with a sharply kinked Pareto frontier. Such sanctions are a natural instrument in an environment in which the agents cannot commit to inspection-contingent
transfers. In principle, formal monetary transfers are one polar case, while wasteful sanctions are
another. Since many realistic scenarios share some features of both polar cases, a natural next step
is to study the implications of wasteful sanctions. In practice, if a team of three or more agents
could commit to inspection-contingent transfers, then promise-keeping would be optimal and
⁵Li and Zhang (2001) formalize Alchian and Demsetz (1972)’s conjecture that costly monitoring should be the
responsibility of a residual claimant. Rahman (2010) and Rahman and Obara (2010) show the monitor need not be
the residual claimant when a mediator can make correlated recommendations. Like Li and Zhang, we show monitoring responsibilities are optimally given to one agent, but like Rahman and Rahman and Obara we need not give the
monitoring agent residual claims. ere is also a literature on costly monitoring in principal-agent relationships (e.g.,
Townsend, 1979; Border and Sobel, 1987; Williamson, 1987; Mookherhjee and Png, 1989; Snyder, 1999).
⁶For example: Alchian and Demsetz (1972); Mirrlees (1976); Holmström (1982); McAfee and McMillan (1991);
Kandel and Lazear (1992); Aoki (1994); Barron and Gjerde (1997); Che and Yoo (2001); Li and Zhang (2001); Battaglini
(2006); Kvaløy and Olsen (2006); Carpenter, Bowles, Gintis, and Hwang (2009).
⁷Matsushima, Miyazaki, and Yagi (2010) also study a model where agents have private information about the feasibility of arbitrarily many independent tasks, but assume that monitoring is exogenous and utility is transferable. Holmström and Milgrom (1991); Legros and Matsushima (1991); Legros and Matthews (1993); Miller (1997); d’Aspremont
and Gérard-Varet (1998); Laux (2001) allow multi-dimensional eﬀort, but their agents have no private information.
Coviello, Ichino, and Persico (2011) study dynamic scheduling of many tasks under diseconomies of scope.
⁸For example: Alchian and Demsetz (1972); Mirrlees (1976); Holmström (1982); Holmström and Milgrom
(1991); Legros and Matsushima (1991); McAfee and McMillan (1991); Legros and Matthews (1993); Miller (1997);
d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1998); Laux (2001); Battaglini (2006); Matsushima, Miyazaki, and Yagi (2010); Rahman
and Obara (2010). Another literature sees bonuses and penalties as nancially equivalent, using reference-dependent
preferences to distinguish the incentive eﬀects (e.g., Aron and Olivella, 1994; Frederickson and Waller, 2005).
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socially costless to implement. In particular, without aﬀecting team welfare, whenever one of his
tasks failed inspection, an agent could be forced to pay arbitrarily high transfers to a third agent
(not the monitor of that task). Empty promises arise in our setting because with socially costly
sanctions, there is a tradeoﬀ between performing all feasible tasks and providing the necessary
incentives to do so.
Our results are organized as follows. First, we examine the basic structure of optimal contracts when there are enough supervisory resources to monitor every task. Section 3.1 considers
the simple case of two identical agents with bounded capacity, one of whom is exogenously assigned to supervise the other. We show that it is optimal for the worker—Bob, in this scenario—to
use a cutoﬀ strategy of performing only up to p∗ feasible tasks. e cutoﬀ p∗ is increasing in the
probability, λ, that any given task is feasible. Empty promises optimally arise for an intermediate
range of λ; they arise for any λ ∈ (0, 1) if either the agents’ capacities are suﬃciently large or the
ratio of private costs to team bene ts is suﬃciently large.⁹ Section 3.2 addresses the question of
who should supervise whom, while maintaining the restrictions that every promised task must be
monitored and that monitoring one task reduces an agents’ capacity to perform tasks by one. Even
though Bob and Carol are identical and are working on independent tasks, we show that a statistical complementarity arises whenever it is optimal for either of them to make empty promises.
en it is strictly optimal for one of them to specialize in performing tasks while the other specializes in monitoring. It is important to emphasize that the strict optimality of having a monitoring
specialist—a supervisor—arises from the fact that it is optimal to make empty promises. If there
are no empty promises, it does not matter how monitoring responsibility is allocated. Section 4
then shows how to economize on monitoring, studying the tradeoﬀ between allocating capacity
to monitoring or production. With N agents, we show that at most the capacity of one agent
is used towards monitoring. Even though promise-keeping can be implemented using only two
units of capacity for monitoring, there are gains from allocating more units to monitoring and
employing empty promises, even if the probability of task feasibility is very high.
For expositional simplicity and tractability, we make a few stylized modeling assumptions that
do not qualitatively aﬀect our main conclusions regarding empty promises and endogenous supervision structures. For instance, our main results assume that monitoring is costless (aside from
its opportunity cost, of course), and therefore take for granted that agents are willing to monitor
⁹e kinked-linear structure of the corresponding contract bears a similarity to the debt-like contracts with lowpowered incentives and random veri cation arising in the costly state veri cation literature (initiated by Townsend
1979). For diﬀerent reasons, low-powered incentives arise in both cases: for Townsend, it is because monitoring is
costly, whereas here it is because punishments are not transfers.
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each other. But our results hold up even if monitoring is costly, as shown in Section 5.1, because
agents can discipline each other for failing to monitor. Suppose that Bob’s rst task turns out not
to be feasible, but Carol does not ag it as uncompleted. en Bob can reveal that he did not
complete it. Bob suﬀers no consequence for this revelation, but Carol is punished. By calibrating
Carol’s sanction to her cost of monitoring, they can assure that Carol monitors properly along the
equilibrium path. We also show that our results are robust to the possibility of exchanging messages after tasks are performed but before they are monitored (Section 5.2), reallocating capacity
(Section 5.3), and to imperfections in monitoring (Section 5.4).

2

Model and preliminaries

Consider a team of N ≥ 2 risk-neutral agents, each of whom may perform or monitor up to
M tasks. ere is a countably in nite set of tasks X , each of which is an identical single-agent job.
Any given task x ∈ X is feasible with independent probability λ ∈ (0, 1). If a task is infeasible,
then it cannot be completed. If a task is feasible, the agent performing it can choose whether to
shirk or exert eﬀort cost c > 0 to complete it. Shirking is costless, but yields no bene t to the team.
If the agent exerts eﬀort to complete the task, each member of the team (including him) receives
an expected bene t

b
N,

where b > c >

b
N.

Hence each task is socially bene cial, but no agent

will complete it without further incentives. To simplify exposition, we assume that monitoring
requires zero eﬀort cost (Section 5.1 shows this can be relaxed without aﬀecting our results).
e timing of the game is as follows:
• At τ = 1, each agent publicly promises to perform a set of tasks. Each task can be promised
by at most one agent.¹⁰ We call a promised task a “promise” for short.
• At τ = 2, each agent privately observes the feasibility of each task he promised, and, for
each feasible task, privately decides whether to shirk or exert eﬀort.
• At τ = 3, agents monitor each other. An agent who made p promises at τ = 1 can monitor
up to M−p of the other agents’ promises. Each task can be monitored by at most one agent,
but the agents can employ an arbitrary correlation device to coordinate their monitoring
activities. Conditional on being monitored, with probability 1 a completed task will pass
inspection, and an uncompleted task will fail inspection.¹¹ e monitoring agent, however,
cannot distinguish whether the task was infeasible or intentionally shirked.
¹⁰e spirit of this assumption is that agents discuss and agree on who will promise which tasks; formally it may
be simpler to assume they make promises sequentially, in arbitrary order.
¹¹Perfect monitoring simpli es the exposition; we discuss imperfect monitoring later.
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• At τ = 4, the agents reveal the results of their inspections.¹²
• At τ = 5, each agent can impose unbounded sanctions on other agents, at no cost to himself.
We consider a setting in which it is not possible to commit to transfers that are contingent on
inspection outcomes; instead, any sanction imposed on an agent is pure waste. We study perfect
Bayesian equilibria of this game. Since the sanctions at τ = 5 are unbounded and costless for
each agent to impose, the agents can discourage any observable deviations from the equilibrium
path—in particular, deviations at time τ = 1 are immediately observable. Moreover, by the revelation principle it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to equilibria in which agents
reveal their inspection results truthfully at time τ = 4. Similarly, since monitoring is costless, we
may ignore deviations from the equilibrium monitoring scheme at time τ = 3. Accordingly, we
limit attention to behavior along the equilibrium path. In such equilibria, the main concern is to
discourage unobservable deviations at time τ = 2. We call the speci cation of equilibrium-path
behavior a contract, for reasons that we address in Remark 1, below.
In what follows, for any countable set Z, let P(Z) denote the power set of Z, and let Δ(Z)
denote the set of probability distributions over Z.
De nition 1. A contract speci es equilibrium behavior, for each agent i = 1, 2, . . . , N, of the
following form:
1. A promise scheme P ∈ ×N
i=1 P(X ), with each distinct Pi and Pj disjoint in X , specifying which
tasks should be promised by which agents;
2. A task completion strategy si : P(Pi ) → Δ(P(Pi )) for each agent i, with every realization a
subset of the argument, specifying the subset of her promises to complete among those feasible;
)
(∪
3. A monitoring scheme r ∈ Δ ×N
i=1 P
j̸=i Pj , with every realization a vector of disjoint
subsets of X , specifying a joint distribution over which agents monitor which tasks;
(
)
N
4. A sanctioning scheme v : ×N
i=1 P(Pi )×P(Pi ) → R− , specifying the net sanction imposed on
each player i = 1, . . . , N as a function of which tasks were shown to pass and fail inspection.
Remark 1 (Contractual interpretation). We refer to truthful equilibrium path behavior as a “contract” to emphasize that this game environment can also be interpreted as a contractual setting.
Suppose some external principal oﬀers the agents a contract in which the principal formally commits to pay each agent b/N for each task completed by the team, and informally recommends a
promise scheme, task completion strategies, a monitoring scheme, and a sanctioning scheme. en
¹²Whether inspection results are veri able does not matter. In Section 5.1, we show that our analysis is robust to
monitoring costs incurred to (veri ably) prove a task has failed inspection.
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it should be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the agents to be obedient to the recommendations
and report their inspection outcomes truthfully, as well as for the principal to implement the recommended sanctioning scheme. We investigate this principal-agent interpretation in Section 6.
A contract must respect each agent’s bounded capacity. A contract is feasible if it satis es
|Pi | + maxR∈supp r |Ri | ≤ M for all i; i.e., no player is asked to perform and monitor more than
M tasks in total. A contract is incentive compatible if no agent has an incentive to deviate from
his task completion strategy, given the promise, monitoring, and sanctioning schemes; and no
agent has an incentive to fail to report his inspection results truthfully. A contract is optimal
if it maximizes the team’s aggregate utility within the class of feasible and incentive compatible
contracts.
Remark 2 (Randomization, noncontingent transfers, and individual rationality). A more general
space of contracts would allow the agents to employ a randomized promise scheme. However, for our
purposes it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to deterministic promise schemes. For
any optimal contract with a random promise scheme, there would be an equally good deterministic
promise scheme in the support of the randomization.
If agents could opt out of the game before time τ = 1, then for any contract yielding positive
social welfare the agents would be willing to accept the contract “behind the veil of ignorance,” i.e.,
before their “roles” (as workers or supervisors) were randomly assigned. Alternatively, by using ex
ante (noncontingent) transfers, it would be easy to spread the wealth so as to make everyone willing
to accept the contract, no matter how asymmetric were the roles. In light of these possibilities, we
do not impose individual rationality constraints on the contract.
Before formalizing the incentive compatibility constraints, we show that the relevant space of
contracts can be simpli ed without loss of generality.
Lemma 1. ere exists an optimal contract satisfying the following, for each agent i:
1. e number of tasks agent i completes is a deterministic function of the set A ⊆ Pi of his tasks
that are feasible (so with some abuse of notation let |si (A)| be this number);
2. Agent i’s sanction depends only on his tasks that failed inspection, so without loss of generality
vi : P(Pi ) → R− ;
3. “Upward” incentive compatibility constraints for task completion are slack—when A ⊆ Pi
tasks are feasible, agent i strictly prefers to complete si (A) over any completing any feasible
set A′ for which |si (A)| < |A′ |;
10

4. si (si (A)) = si (A); in addition, A ⊆ A′ implies |si (A)| ≤ |si (A′ )|.
It follows from part 2 of Lemma 1 that agents have no disincentive to report their inspection
results truthfully, enabling us to henceforth ignore the incentive constraints for truthful revelation.
Given a promise scheme P, a task completion strategy pro le s, and a monitoring scheme r, let
ρi (f; si (A)) be the probability f ⊆ Pi is the set of player i’s tasks that fails inspection when player i
completes the set of tasks si (A), and let pi = |Pi |. e optimal contract (P, s, r, v) maximizes
∑N ∑
i=1

A⊆Pi

(
∑
λ|A| (1 − λ)pi −|A| |si (A)|(b − c) +

)
f⊆Pi

vi (f)ρi (f; si (A))

(1)

subject to feasibility and downward incentive compatibility (IC)
∑
f⊆Pi

) ∑
(
vi (f)ρi (f; si (A)) + |si (A)| Nb − c ≥

f⊆Pi

(
)
vi (f)ρi (f; A′ ) + |A′ | Nb − c

(2)

for each downward deviation A′ ⊂ si (A), for each set of feasible tasks A ⊆ Pi , and for each agent i.

3

Empty promises and endogenous supervision

In this section we show the optimality of empty promises and how they endogenously give rise to
optimal supervision structures. roughout this section, we impose the restriction that every task
must be monitored. A strategy si has empty promises if there is some subset A of the promises of
agent i for which si (A) ̸= A. Otherwise (i.e., if si (A) = A for all A), the strategy involves promise
keeping. Our results identify cutoﬀ strategies as an important class of task completion strategies. A
task completion strategy si is a cutoﬀ strategy if there is a cutoﬀ p∗i such that |si (A)| = min{|A|, p∗i }
for every subset A of agent i’s promises; a cutoﬀ strategy has empty promises if p∗i < pi . In a
contract, if one of these descriptors applies to all the agents’ strategies, then the descriptor applies
to the contract as well.

3.1 A worker and a supervisor
Before discussing how endogenous supervision may arise in Section 3.2, we rst examine the
implications of a simple supervisory structure. Suppose the team consists of two members, and
that the promise scheme calls for a “worker” who promises all the tasks and a “supervisor” who
monitors all the tasks. Because only one agent is completing tasks, we drop the i subscript and
simply use p to denote the number of promises that the worker makes and s to denote his task
completion strategy. e following result characterizes optimal worker-supervisor contracts.
11

eorem 1. Conditional on a worker-supervisor structure, there is an optimal contract such that:
1. e worker promises M tasks, but uses a cutoﬀ strategy, completing at most p∗ feasible tasks.
e supervisor monitors all M tasks.
2. e cutoﬀ p∗ is increasing in λ.

(
3. ere are empty promises (0 < p∗ < p) if 1 − 2 −

)
c 1/M
b/2

<λ<

(

c
b/2

−1

)1/M

.

4. Sanctions depend only on the number of failed inspections. No sanction is imposed on the
worker up to a threshold of p − p∗ inspection failures, but each additional inspection failure
results in a marginal sanction of c − b/2.
eorem 1 says that the optimal worker-supervisor contract has the worker complete only up
to a cutoﬀ p∗ of tasks, even though the worker makes M promises and the supervisor monitors
each and every one. e cutoﬀ p∗ , which is increasing in the probability of task feasibility λ,
is strictly positive whenever 1 − (2 −

smaller than the number of

promises made whenever λ <

< c < b and so

c 1/M
< λ, and is strictly
b/2 )
c
1/M
( b/2 − 1) . Recall that for N = 2, b2

c
b/2

∈ (1, 2).

Hence, the interval of λ’s for which there are empty promises increases with both the capacity and
cost-bene t ratio. Indeed:
Corollary 1. Conditional on a worker-supervisor structure, for any λ ∈ (0, 1) and

c
b

there exists

M < ∞ suﬃciently large that an optimal contract has empty promises; for any λ ∈ (0, 1) and
M < ∞ there exists

c
b

< 1 suﬃciently large that an optimal contract has empty promises.

We prove eorem 1 below. To understand the intuition for empty promises, note that even
if the worker intends to keep all his promises, some of his tasks are likely to be infeasible because
λ < 1, so he will incur sanctions anyway. Since sanctions are costly, it is possible to reduce the
cost of sanctions by forgiving a few failures. However, the worker is able to move the support of
the monitoring distribution: for example, if he makes ten promises, and the threshold for being
sanctioned is three failures, then he will never ful ll more than eight promises, even if all ten are
feasible. When λ is not too close to one, this tradeoﬀ is resolved in favor of empty promises.
Proof. Suppose that the task completion strategy s is optimal and that the worker optimally promises
the set of tasks P. Note that if the worker completes s(A) when the set A ⊂ P is feasible, then all
of P \ s(A) will fail inspection. Incentive compatibility of s requires that for all A′ ⊂ s(A),
)
(
)
(
v(P \ s(A)) + |s(A)| Nb − c ≥ v(P \ A′ ) + |A′ | Nb − c .
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(3)

Let p∗ = maxA⊆P |s(A)| be the size of the largest set of tasks completed under s (in light of
Lemma 1, p∗ = |s(P)|). Examination of Eq. 3 reveals that the expected sanction is minimized under the kinked linear sanctioning scheme v(P\s(A)) = ( b2 −c) max{|P\s(A)|−(p−p∗ ), 0}, which
imposes no sanction when p∗ or more tasks are completed, but a sanction of ( b2 − c)(p∗ − s(A))

whenever |s(A)| < p∗ . is sanctioning scheme is kinked-linear in the number of tasks left un-

completed. Consider extending the de nition of v above to all subsets of P of size at most p∗ .
Suppose that for some subset A ⊂ P of size at most p∗ , the strategy prescribes s(A) ⊂ A. But
then s is suboptimal, since completing the extra tasks a \ s(A) both decreases v(P \ s(A)) and has
a positive externality on the supervisor. Hence s must be a cutoﬀ strategy, with cutoﬀ p∗ . us
far, points (1) and (4) are proven.
Substituting the kinked-linear sanctioning scheme into Eq. 1, the team’s welfare reduces to
p∗

(b
2

∑p
)
− c + b2

( p)

a=0 a

λa (1 − λ)p−a min{a, p∗ }.

(4)

Note that Eq. 4 is maximized at p = M. By contrast, p∗ has a positive eﬀect on the second term but
a negative eﬀect in the rst term (since b2 − c < 0). e second term, which we call the truncated

expectation, has increasing diﬀerences in p∗ and λ, leading to the monotone comparative statics
in point (2). Given that p∗ is increasing in λ, there will be empty promises whenever (i) using
p∗ = 1 gives a larger value in Eq. 4 than does p∗ = 0, to avoid the degenerate case in which the

optimal number of promises may as well be zero; and (ii) using p∗ = M − 1 gives a larger value in
Eq. 4 than does p∗ = M, so that the cutoﬀ is strictly smaller than the number of promises made.
e interval in point (3) then follows from algebra.
It is clear from Eq. 4 that the optimal cutoﬀ is the smallest p∗ for which
p∗

(b
2

∑p
)
− c + b2

(p)

a=0 a

λa (1 − λ)p−a min{a, p∗ }
∑p
(
)
≥ (p∗ + 1) b2 − c + b2

(p)

a=0 a

Let μ λ,M (p∗ + 1) =

∑p

feasible tasks is at least
μ λ,M (p∗ + 1) ≤

c
b/2

λa (1 − λ)p−a min{a, p∗ + 1}. (5)

()

p a
p−a be the binomial probability that the number of
a=p∗ +1 a λ (1 − λ)
p∗ + 1. Rearranging the above, the optimal cutoﬀ is the rst p∗ for which

− 1. It follows that p∗ ≤ Mλ when

c
b/2

≥ 32 . More generally, using a normal

approximation to the binomial, p∗ /M ≈ λ − O(M−3/2 ) for large M (see Eq. 20 in the appendix).
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3.2 Endogenous supervision
e features that agents should optimally employ cutoﬀ strategies for promise completion, that
those cutoﬀs are increasing in λ, and that the optimal sanctioning scheme is forgiving, are not
speci c to the worker-supervisor structure studied above. Indeed, the results of eorem 1 extend
to any contract with complete monitoring: for every promise of every agent, there is another agent
who monitors that promise with probability one.
Corollary 2. Conditional on complete monitoring, there is an optimal contract such that each
agent i has a cutoﬀ strategy for task completion, doing at most p∗i feasible tasks and the sanctioning
scheme is kinked-linear. Each agent’s cutoﬀ p∗i is increasing in λ.

ere are many possible complete monitoring contracts. For example, suppose there are two
workers (Alice and Bob) who each have 8 hours to work, and each task (performing or monitoring)
takes 1 hour. Aside from a worker-supervisor contract under which Alice monitors 8 tasks and
Bob promises 8 tasks (or vice-versa), other possible contracts include, for example, that Alice and
Bob each promise 4 tasks and monitor 4 tasks, or that Alice does 2 tasks and monitors 6 tasks
while Bob does 6 tasks and monitors 2 tasks. For N > 2, more intricate possibilities exist. As the
following result shows, in the presence of empty promises these contracts are not payoﬀ-identical.
eorem 2. Conditional on complete monitoring, a worker-supervisor contract is optimal when
there are two agents. When N > 2 agents, the division of labor in an optimal contract includes
at least one supervisor (who specializes in monitoring). Among the workers who promise tasks, if
agent i makes more promises than j (pi > pj ) then he also has a higher cutoﬀ for task completion

than j (p∗i > p∗j ). e optimality in this result is strict if and only if λ is such that there are empty
promises under the optimal worker-supervisor contract.

As seen in the proof below, whenever empty promises are optimal, supervision endogenously
arises for statistical reasons, despite the symmetry of players and independence of tasks. It is
particularly intuitive to consider the case in which M and p∗ are even, and compare a workersupervisor contract in which the worker uses the cutoﬀ p∗ < M, to a symmetric contract in
which both players make M/2 promises and use the cutoﬀ p∗ /2. In both cases the total numbers
of promises and empty promises are the same. Suppose exactly p∗ tasks turn out to be feasible. In
the worker-supervisor contract all of them will be completed. However, in the symmetric contract
all of them will be completed if and only if each player turns out to have exactly half of them.
e fact that each player has a separate cutoﬀ in the symmetric contract means there are two
14

constraints to be satis ed, rather than just the one in the worker-supervisor contract. e same
issue arises when comparing any two arbitrary contracts with the same total number of promises
and the same total (positive) number of empty promises—whichever is the more asymmetric is
superior.
Proof. Consider a putative optimal complete monitoring contract in which each agent i makes
pi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , M} promises and has a cutoﬀ p∗i for task completion. By complete monitoring,
∑N ∗
∑
N
NM
∗
i=1 pi . In analogy to Eq. 4, the team welfare is given by
i=1 pi = 2 . Let psum =
∑N ( (
)
p∗i Nb − c +
i=1

N−1
N b

∑p i
a=0

(p )
i

a

)
λa (1 − λ)pi −a min{a, p∗i } .

(6)

Consider the case where p∗k < pk for some agent k, and imagine a diﬀerent complete monitoring contract (with a corresponding optimal sanctioning scheme) where each agent i makes p̃i
∑N ∗
∑
NM
∗
promises and has a cutoﬀ p̃∗i , also having the property that N
i=1 p̃i .
i=1 p̃i = 2 and psum =
Could this contract welfare-dominate the putative optimal contract? Note that since the sum
of cutoﬀs is the same, the ranking of the two contracts is determined by their truncated expec∑pi (p ) a
pi −a min{a, p∗ }) in Eq. 6. Note that each truncated expectation is
i
tations ( a=0
i
a λ (1 − λ)

supermodular in p and p∗ . is is because the condition for increasing diﬀerences reduces to
∑p+1
a=p∗ +1

(p+1)
a

λa (1 − λ)p+1−a −

∑p
a=p∗ +1

(p)
a

λa (1 − λ)p−a > 0,

(7)

which holds because making more promises leads to a rst-order stochastic improvement in the
number of feasible tasks. Since the truncated expectation is zero when pi = p∗i = 0, supermodularity implies superadditivity. In particular, when N = 2, superadditivity immediately implies
that the putative optimal contract is dominated unless it is a worker-supervisor contract. For the
case N > 2, note rst there must be at least one pair of agents i, j for whom pi + pj < M, else
the contract would violate complete monitoring. is again ensures that there must be an agent
specializing in monitoring. Moreover, the rearrangement inequality of Lorentz (1953) for supermodular sums implies that to maximize Eq. 6, it must be that pi ≥ pj implies p∗i ≥ p∗j .¹³ Finally,
observe that when p∗i = pi for every worker, the expected number of promises completed per
worker is pi λ, and it is irrelevant how those promises are allocated across workers.
ere are two diﬀerent ways to interpret complete monitoring. Under one interpretation,
¹³e Lorentz-Fan rearrangement
inequality
says if f : Rk → R is a supermodular function, then for any collection
∑n
1
n ∑n
i
∗i
of vectors (x , . . . , x ), i=1 f(x ) ≤ i=1 f(x ), where x∗i is the “majorized” vector which, for every dimension k,
contains the ith largest component among x1k , . . . xnk . Here xi = (pi , p∗i ) and f transforms xi into a summand in Eq. 6.
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units of capacity are not substitutable across performance and monitoring. Rather, there are
performance units and

NM
2

NM
2

monitoring units, and the problem is to allocate these units within

the team. Under a second interpretation, units of capacity are perfectly substitutable across performance and monitoring, and complete monitoring arises when the two functions receive equal
allocations. In this second interpretation, complete monitoring is an ad hoc constraint. e following section relaxes this constraint, allowing the team to monitor less in order to accomplish
more.

4

Trading oﬀ performance and monitoring

In this section, we examine the optimality of empty promises when units of capacity are substitutable between performance and monitoring. For example, rather than monitor all the worker’s
performance tasks, the supervisor in the previous section could use some of her units of capacity towards performing tasks—in which case the worker would need to monitor some tasks as
well. In particular, they may wish to allocate more units of capacity to performing tasks than to
monitoring tasks (else, in view of eorem 2, their original worker-supervisor arrangement was
optimal). With too little monitoring, however, they may not be able to implement nely-tuned
sanctioning schemes. ese concerns raise several questions. How much capacity should they
devote to monitoring? How much capacity should they devote to empty promises, and how much
to promises that they intend to ful ll? Does it matter how monitoring responsibility is distributed?
e ability to trade oﬀ performance and monitoring generates some diﬃculties. If fewer tasks
are being monitored than an agent promised, it will not generally be possible to compute the optimal sanctioning scheme and task completion strategies as we did in the previous section. While
under complete monitoring it is simple to make all relevant incentive constraints bind, under incomplete monitoring the sanctioning scheme generally has too few degrees of freedom relative to
the task-completion strategy. Compounding this problem, there is a gap between the sanctioning
scheme and the expected sanction: conditional on the tasks a player completed, inspection outcomes depend probabilistically on the monitoring distribution. Because sanctions are restricted
to be negative, it may be impossible to generate the expected sanctioning scheme that would make
a given combination of incentive constraints bind.¹⁴
¹⁴In fact, we have numerical examples where the optimal contract does not have a kinked-linear sanctioning scheme
and cutoﬀ strategies. eorem 4 in the supplemental appendix shows that kinked-linear sanctions and cutoﬀ strategies
do remain optimal when the magnitude of sanctions are restricted to be increasing and convex in the number of failed
inspections, as might be the case in settings where sanctions are imposed by third parties who are more inclined to
exact punishment if they perceive a consistent pattern of failures. We prove this by showing that player i’s expected
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Nonetheless, we are able to characterize several key features of optimal contracts in this general environment. e following theorem shows that our basic results on empty promises and
endogenous supervision structures extend when monitoring may be incomplete and stochastic.
eorem 3. Consider any capacity size M, number of agents N, and cost-bene t ratio

c
b.

When

units of capacity are substitutable between performance and monitoring, the following hold:
1. An optimal contract allocates at least two and at most M units of capacity to monitoring.
2. Conditional on promise-keeping, an optimal contract has two “partial supervisors” who each
monitor one task.
3. An optimal contract has empty promises if at least three units of capacity are allocated to
monitoring.
4. Conditional on allocating M units of capacity to monitoring, an optimal contract satis es
the results of Corollary 2 on sanctioning schemes, cutoﬀ strategies, and monotonicity of pi
and p∗i in λ for each agent i; moreover,

(a) if N = 2, an optimal contract assigns monitoring responsibilities to a single supervisor;
(b) if N > 2, then for any ε > 0 there is M < ∞ such that if M ≥ M, a contract with one
supervisor and N − 1 agents making M promises and using a cutoﬀ strategy with
⌈
(
)⌉
c
√
1+N− b/2
N
p∗ = Mλ − 2M(1 − λ)λ erf −1
1−N

(8)

attains a 1 − ε fraction of the welfare of an optimal contract.¹⁵
5. For any M and N, there is λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that the single-supervisor contract with empty
promises in Point 4 dominates all promise-keeping contracts whenever λ ≤ λ∗ . If λ is suﬃciently high given M, N, and bc , then promise-keeping is optimal. But empty promises may be
optimal even when λ is close to 1 if the cost-bene t ratio of tasks is moderately high: for any M
and N, empty promises are optimal even in a neighborhood of λ =

M−2
M−1

when

c
b

>

2+(e/N)
2+e

(which converges to approximately 0.42 as N → ∞).
Proof. See the appendix. Some intuition for the proof is provided below.
sanctioning scheme will be convex in the number of her promises she fails to ful ll. is implies that if player i prefers
completing p̃ promises over p̃ − 1 promises, then she must also prefer completing p̃ − k promises over p̃ − (k +
1) promises for all k = 1, . . . , p̃ − 1. We then use a duality argument to show that the Lagrange multipliers for the
convexity constraints imply a recursion that can be used to solve for the optimal expected sanctioning scheme. at
expression can be written in terms of the expected number of discovered unful lled promises above a threshold, and
is optimally implemented by a kinked-linear sanctioning scheme.
¹⁵erf −1 is the inverse of the Gaussian error function.
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Team welfare
Promise keeping

1500

1000

Empty promises with
two partial supervisors
500

Empty promises
with probabilistically
complete monitoring
0.2

Probability of
task feasibility

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

F
1: Capacity M = 100, number of players N = 4, task bene t b = 10, task cost c = 6. e
blue line is the social value of promise keeping for each λ. As a function of λ, for workers using a cutoﬀ
of p∗ ∈ {1, . . . , M − 1}, each green curve is the social value of a partial supervision contract with two
promise-keeping supervisors who each monitor one task; while red is the social value of a contract with
1
one supervisor who monitors all the tasks of a given worker with probability N−1
.

We begin by drawing some insights from our analysis of complete monitoring. Note that the
same expected sanctions (and cutoﬀ strategies) available under complete monitoring are available
even when only M units of capacity are allocated to monitoring, simply by employing a correlated
randomization device to determine which player to monitor using all the other players’ monitoring capacity, and then scaling the sanctioning scheme appropriately. at is, for each player i there
is an αi ∈ (0, 1] such that with probability αi all of i’s tasks are monitored, and with probability
1 − αi none of her tasks are monitored. en her new sanctioning scheme is vi multiplied by 1/αi ,
so that, taking expectations over whether she will be monitored, her expected sanctioning scheme
is exactly vi .¹⁶ Hence devoting more resources toward monitoring reduces capacity available for
¹⁶Depending on when capacity must be allocated, correlation eﬀects may further favor having a single supervisor
under this type of monitoring. Consider a team of three agents (Alice, Bob, and Carol), with M = 4. Suppose Alice
promises four tasks, and Bob and Carol each promise two tasks and monitor two tasks. With probability 1/2, Bob and
Carol each monitor two (diﬀerent) tasks Alice promised; and with probability 1/2, Bob and Carol each monitor each
other. But if Bob learns at t = 1 that he will monitor Alice, he will have no incentive to complete any tasks, since he
will know that Carol will monitor Alice as well. eorem 3(4) shows that a single supervisor optimally arises even if
the realization of the monitoring scheme is kept secret until τ = 3.
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performing tasks without improving over complete monitoring with regard to incentives. is
yields point (1).
Moreover, our previous analysis extends to show that cutoﬀ strategies are optimal, conditional
on optimally allocating M units of capacity to monitoring in the manner described above. As in
the previous section, it is best to assign all monitoring to one supervisor when N = 2. When
N > 2, we use a continuous, normal approximation to the binomial distribution to show that
having a single supervisor is approximately optimal (leaving open the conjecture that it is in fact
exactly optimal). is yields point (4).
Conditional on implementing promise keeping, monitoring can be minimized (and therefore
the number of tasks completed can be maximized) in the following manner. Two agents become
partial supervisors, who each monitor one task and make M − 1 promises. A correlated randomization device determines whether, with probability 1/2, each supervisor monitors the other; with
the remaining probability, the supervisors combine their monitoring capacity to monitor a uniformly chosen worker among the N − 2 other agents, each of whom make M promises. e sanctioning scheme is linear so that all agents are willing to complete all their feasible promises, and
all incentive constraints bind. erefore, this is the optimal way to implement promise keeping,
yielding point (2). Point (3) then follows from point (2): whenever more than two units capacity
are devoted to monitoring in an optimal contract, it must be the case that promise keeping is
suboptimal. When two units of capacity are used, the optimal task completion cutoﬀ may still be
strictly smaller than p even if λ is very high (see Figure 1), as the same two units of monitoring
may be used to provide a forgiving contract instead.
Point (5) shows that contracts with empty promises are optimal for a range of parameters.
First, if λ is moderately low, the promise keeping is dominated by assigning a single supervisor to
use his full capacity to monitor the other agents. Even for λ very close to 1, empty promises dominate promise keeping if M and bc are suﬃciently large; in particular, promise keeping is dominated
by a forgiving, empty promises contract with two partial supervisors, each allocating one unit of
capacity to monitoring. Figure 1 illustrates point (5) for the case of N = 4, M = 100, and

c
b

= 35 ,

showing that promise keeping is dominated for nearly any λ by the envelope of some simple contracts with empty promises. For λ between about 0.1 and about 0.7, a single-supervisor contract
as in point (4) dominates promise keeping. is is because when λ is low, agents are likely to nd
many of their tasks to be infeasible. For λ above 0.7, tasks are too valuable to “waste” M units of
capacity on monitoring, but even with only two units of capacity allocated to monitoring it is still
optimal to implement a forgiving contract with empty promises unless λ is extremely close to 1.
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5

Extensions

5.1 Costly monitoring
e analysis thus far assumed that monitoring is costless, and therefore agents are indiﬀerent
over whether to monitor each other. If, however, monitoring requires nonveri able, costly eﬀort,
the question of “who monitors the monitor” arises. Rahman (2010) shows that to provide incentives for monitoring, agents should occasionally shirk just to “test” the monitor. Since our model
already generates optimal shirking (in the form of empty promises), we set monitoring costs to
zero to highlight the fact that shirking arises from an entirely diﬀerent mechanism. Adapting
Rahman’s argument, as follows, shows that the contracts we construct are robust to monitoring
costs, without requiring any additional shirking.
Suppose that monitoring is costly. A monitor can always claim that a task passed inspection,
but must exert eﬀort to show that a task failed his inspection. To induce him to exert monitoring eﬀort, the team can add an additional stage, τ = 6, to their interaction. After the sanctions
for failed tasks are implemented in τ = 5, in τ = 6 each agent reports which tasks he himself
completed. Agents are not punished for these reports, and are therefore willing to report truthfully. Whenever an agent reveals an uncompleted task in τ = 6 that was not reported as failing
inspection in τ = 4, whichever teammate (if any) was supposed to monitor that task is punished.
Because task feasibility is random, even under promise-keeping there is positive probability that
some tasks were not completed. erefore a suﬃciently large sanction induces faithful monitoring, and need not be incurred in equilibrium.

5.2 Messages that economize on monitoring
A recent literature studies the bene ts of messages in contract design under private information.¹⁷
In our model, incorporating messages can reduce the amount of monitoring needed. Consider
the case in which all the tasks an agent promises are monitored. Matsushima, Miyazaki, and Yagi
(2010) suggest that the principal should require an agent with private information to work on a
certain number of tasks, which the agent should announce to the principal. Adapting this idea
to our setting, we nd that the same task completion strategies studied in earlier sections can be
implemented using fewer than M units of capacity for monitoring. To see this, suppose an agent
promises the set of tasks P and his task completion strategy is s. Modify the contract to allow the
¹⁷For example: Jackson and Sonnenschein (2005); Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007); Matsushima, Miyazaki, and
Yagi (2010); Frankel (2011).
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agent to tell the other agents which p∗ of his tasks to monitor, where p∗ = |s(P)| is the largest
number of tasks he would ever complete. Clearly, the agent will include in his report all the tasks
he has completed. us, no more than p∗ tasks need to be monitored. Note that if there are
monitoring costs, the method in Section 5.1 for “monitoring the monitor” remains feasible since
there is positive probability that fewer than p∗ tasks were feasible.
Monitoring schemes with messages allow more resources to be devoted to performing tasks
while still maintaining the optimal expected sanctioning scheme and cutoﬀ strategies. e optimal cutoﬀ balances the resulting tradeoﬀ between reducing the amount of monitoring and
increasing the number of tasks completed. However, because the opportunity cost of empty
promises is reduced for any given λ, promise-keeping becomes even less attractive than before.
Once again, diﬀerent allocations of supervisory responsibility will not be welfare-equivalent under empty promises. With messages, a “supervisor” would have unused units of capacity which
could be allocated towards completing tasks. Since another agent must monitor him, optimal
supervision structures with two partial supervisors in a team of N agents are again likely to arise.

5.3 Reallocating tasks
We have assumed that if an agent promises a task that ends up being infeasible, she cannot reallocate that unit of capacity toward monitoring. Recall that the optimal way to implement promisekeeping in our original setting is via a linear contract that makes all incentive constraints bind.
As with point (2) of eorem 3, for a linear contract the same schedule of expected sanctions
can be maintained by scaling the actual sanctions inversely with the number of monitoring slots
employed. Consequently, the opportunity to allocate additional capacity towards monitoring is
useful for reducing expected sanctions only if empty promises are optimal.
In our model, a task is either feasible or infeasible, regardless of whom it is assigned to. But
there could be interesting team settings where the feasibility of any given task is idiosyncratic to
each agent. is raises the possibility that agents could exchange tasks, to see whether the tasks
that are infeasible for one might be feasible for another. Allowing for this would signi cantly alter
the model, since it would require inserting both a task-trading phase and an additional task performance phase in between τ = 2 and τ = 3. At an intuitive level, however, allowing task trading
would simply change the distribution over how many feasible tasks an agent might nd, and an
agent would still face a positive probability of nding fewer than he is willing to perform. Moreover, task-trading introduces the new incentive constraint that an agent should not want to trade
away a feasible task unless that he is supposed to ful ll. So there is still the same incentive problem
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of motivating him to perform tasks rather than claim they are infeasible for him. Qualitatively,
the same kinds of results on empty promises and concentrated supervision would arise.

5.4 Imperfect monitoring
We have assumed that when a shirked task is monitored, it will fail inspection with probability
one. What if a shirked task that is monitored fails inspection with probability γ ∈ (0, 1)? In
this case, the characterization of the optimal contract, conditional on M units of monitoring,
continues to hold for γ not too far from one; and the other points in eorem 3 continue to hold
independently of γ.
e optimality of empty promises in eorem 3 is unaﬀected by imperfect monitoring because
the expected social welfare of the contract shown to dominate promise keeping is independent
of γ. is contract is such that the sanctioning scheme depends on the number of failed inspections, and punishes only when the maximal number of failures is found. Letting F denote the
number of tasks of a player that are monitored under this contract, the probability that F failures
( )/(p)
are found when a tasks are completed and p are promised is given by γ F p−a
. e expected
(p−a)/(Fp) F
F
sanction conditional on completing a tasks is then given by v(F)γ F
F , which can be made
independent of γ by scaling the sanction v(F) by the factor

1
.
γF

Our characterization of the optimal contract, conditional on M units of monitoring, relies on
being able to nd a sanctioning scheme under which the expected sanctioning scheme makes all
relevant incentive constraints bind. When the monitoring technology is suﬃciently imperfect,
such a schedule may not exist. Consider the simple case in which an agent makes three promises,
all of which are monitored. An uncompleted task fails inspection with probability 14 . Suppose
for simplicity that

b
N

− c = 1. To induce a cutoﬀ of p∗ = 2, the optimal sanction would be

zero whenever at least two tasks are completed, −1 if one task is completed, and −2 if no task
is completed. Taking into account the probability of failing inspection, the sanctioning scheme
(v(0), v(1), v(2), v(3)) should satisfy
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(9)

where the a-th row and the f-th column of the 4 × 4 matrix corresponds to the probability that
f failures will be found when a tasks are completed. e unique solution to this system sets
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v(0) = v(1) = 0, v(2) = −16, and v(3) = 16. at is, the agent would have to receive a reward of 16 if the maximal number of failures are found. e diﬃculty here is that described by
Farkas’ Lemma: there is not always a negative solution to a linear system. By continuity, however,
since a solution exists when the technology is perfect, one exists when the technology is not too
imperfect. Indeed, in the example above one can nd a sanctioning scheme that generates the
desired expected sanctioning scheme for any γ larger than about 1/3.

6

Teams within rms

When a team is embedded within a larger rm, the agents on the team may not directly bene t
from the tasks they complete. e rm may be able to oﬀer contractual bonuses that depend on
the team’s performance, but not on the performance of individual team members. At the level of
individual performance, only wasteful sanctions (peer pressure, separation, etc.) are available. In
this section we show that the rm’s problem of designing an optimal contract in this environment
is similar to the problem the agents would face if they were partners, as characterized in the
previous sections.
e rm hires a team of n agents to perform tasks and monitor each other. e rm reaps the
entire bene t B from each task, but cannot observe who performed it. Agents have limited liability
in terms of money, but can suﬀer from wasteful sanctions. For comparison to earlier results, we
assume that c < B < Nc. e rm makes the agents a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer comprising:
1. A xed ex ante payment ti ≥ 0 for each i;
2. A bonus b ≥ 0, paid to the team for each completed task, and split equally among the agents
so that each receives b/N;
3. A randomization over contracts (promise schemes, task completion strategies, monitoring
schemes, and sanctioning schemes; see De nition 1).
Each agent accepts the oﬀer if and only if her expected utility from the oﬀer is at least as high as
her exogenous outside option, which is normalized to zero. Each agents’ incentive compatibility
constraint is simply Eq. 2. As discussed in Remark 2, even if the rm’s oﬀer puts some agents into
supervisory roles and others into productive roles, by randomizing the agents’ roles after they
accept the contract it can satisfy their individual rationality constraints as long as their expected
utilities sum to at least zero. e rm’s objective function is
∑N (
∑
−ti +
i=1

A⊆Pi

λ|A| (1 − λ)pi −|A| |si (A)|(B − b)
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)
(10)

For the usual reasons, IR must bind in an optimal contract.¹⁸ Substituting the binding IR
constraints into Eq. 10 reduces the rm’s objective function to the team’s objective function (Eq. 1)
but with B in place of b. at is, when the rm hires the agents as a team, for any xed bonus b its
optimal contract is exactly the same as the optimal contract for the agents if they were partners.
However, now the bonus is also a choice variable rather than a parameter.
A bonus based on team output, naturally, is a crude instrument for providing incentives, since
each team member receives b/N whenever any team member completes a task. Since pro tability
for the rm requires b < B, and yet B/N < c, the bonus alone (i.e., without informal sanctions)
cannot motivate the agents to perform and still yield positive pro t for the rm. Hence if the rm’s
optimal contract is non-degenerate, it must employ both a nonzero bonus and a non-degenerate
sanctioning scheme. Observe, however, that as the team gets larger it becomes more and more
expensive to use the bonus for motivation. Indeed, since b is bounded above by B regardless
of N, the bonus loses its motivational power in the limit as N → ∞. At this limit, only sanctions
provide incentives, so the bonus might as well be replaced by a xed ex ante payment, since its
only purpose is to meet the agents’ IR constraints. As for the form of the rm’s optimal contract,
since b ≤ B is required for pro tability, our previous conclusions still hold—empty promises
arise for an intermediate range of λ. For settings like Figure 1, empty promises dominate promise
keeping unless λ is very high.
ese characteristics are consistent with the stylized facts identi ed by Baker, Jensen, and
Murphy (1987)—individual nancial incentives are rare—and Oyer and Schaefer (2005)—broadbased group incentives are common. According to the model, these contractual features are optimal when the rm cannot formally monitor employees at the individual level, and must supplement its formal incentives at the team level with peer monitoring and informal sanctions at
the individual level. at is, industries where production is complex and requires accumulated
job-speci c human capital, as discussed in the introduction. For a striking example, Knez and
Simester (2001) show that introducing a rm-level bonus scheme, complemented by peer monitoring and informal sanctions, increased on-time performance at Continental Airlines in the
mid-1990s. e rm-wide bonus, coupled with the highly interdependent nature of on-time
¹⁸Consider a non-degenerate contract (in which agents complete some tasks) for which limited liability binds the
bonus (b = 0) and IR is slack. e ex ante payments must be greater than zero (otherwise only a degenerate contract
would be individually rational). But the rm can bene t from reducing the ex ante payments to zero, making it up
to the agents by increasing the bonus to compensate. (When ex ante payments are zero, IR implies that the bonus
satis es b ≥ c.) But since an increase in the bonus strengthens the agents’ incentives, the rm can induce the same
task performance at lower expected cost. erefore the ex ante payments must be zero and the bonus must be nonzero.
Further, IR cannot be slack, since the rm could impose marginally harsher sanctions in order to marginally reduce
the bonus.
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performance, provided each workgroup suﬃcient incentives to collectively prefer a high-eﬀort
equilibrium. At the individual level, high eﬀort was supported by informal sanctions, where the
members of each workgroup would “monitor and sanction their colleagues to enforce the group
decision” (p. 746).

7

Discussion

We study a model of teams in which agents optimally make empty promises, and are “forgiven”
for having done so. Doing so buﬀers against the potential infeasibility of tasks, thereby minimizing costly sanctions. Because such buﬀering reduces the number of completed tasks, empty
promises would not be optimal if formal, performance-contingent transfers could be made. is
optimal equilibrium phenomenon is robust to a tradeoﬀ between performance and monitoring,
even though empty promises use up capacity that could otherwise be allocated towards having a
ner, more attenuated monitoring scheme.
Our model endogenously gives rise to optimal supervisory structures, despite the fact that all
agents and tasks are identical. Although there is no inherent complementarity in task completion,
statistical complementarities arise from the socially optimal task completion strategies. Simply
stated, there are increasing returns to a worker’s task load when he makes empty promises: doubling both his number of promises and his cutoﬀ for task completion more than doubles his social
contribution. Consequently, it is best to have one agent do all the “working” and the other agent
all the “supervising” rather than have mixed roles. Under the assumption of unbounded liability,
this intuition implies that there should be at most two supervisors, no matter how large the team.
More realistically, a bound on liability would yield a lower bound on the ratio of supervisors to
workers.
Introducing asymmetries into the model, even with complete information, may lead to additional interesting predictions. Suppose, for example, that the probability of task feasibility λ
is player-speci c. en the least capable player should be performing as few tasks as possible,
and using his resources towards supervision instead. is accords with the “Dilbert principle,”
which suggests that less productive team members should become supervisors (Adams, 1996).
Of course, if an agent who is better at performing tasks could also train other agents, and if supervising and teaching are complementary, then it may be optimal for the most productive team
members to supervise.
While the capacity constraints in our model serve the technical purpose of ensuring an optimal solution, they are also amenable to a bounded rationality interpretation. Although it is
25

commonly assumed in contract theory that an agent’s memory has unlimited capacity and perfect recall, evidence from psychology shows that working memory is both sharply bounded and
imperfect.¹⁹ One interpretation for the limiting resource is a bound on the number of tasks an
agent can remember. A task in this view contains detailed information, such as a decision tree,
that is necessary to complete it properly.²⁰ Imperfect task feasibility may arise from being unable
to remember all the necessary details for proper task completion. When tasks are complex, it
may be impossible to fully specify their details in a convenient written form, such as a contract.
As noted by Aoki (1988, p. 15), “the experience-based knowledge shared by a team of workers on
the shop oor may be tacit and not readily transferable in the form of formal language.” Without
a convenient way to fully specify a task, an agent who promises to perform the task must expend
memory resources to store the relevant details. Moreover, another agent may need to expend
resources to store those details in order to be able to monitor him, leading to a tradeoﬀ between
performance and monitoring as in Section 4. Coping with multiple complex tasks “may require
more versatile workers’ skills (deeper and broader information-processing capacities), which have
not been considered essential in traditional hierarchies” (Aoki, 1988, p. 31).
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Appendix A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. (Part 1) Suppose there is an optimal contract in which the promise scheme
is not deterministic. However, since the promise scheme is realized publicly, there is an equally
good contract that assigns probability 1 to whichever realization yields the highest welfare.
(Part 2) First, for agents to reveal their inspection results truthfully, their sanction must not depend on their announcements at time τ = 4. Moreover, conditional on the monitoring scheme,
an agent has no in uence over whether other agents’ tasks pass or fail inspection. So for any
sanctioning scheme that depends on other agents’ outcomes, it is equally eﬀective to employ a
modi ed sanctioning scheme in which the agent’s sanction is conditioned only on his own outcomes, where the sanctioning scheme is set to oﬀer the same expected sanctioning scheme as the
original contract. Second, conditional on which of his promised tasks fail inspection, an agent
has no in uence over which of his tasks pass inspection—passed inspections depend entirely on
how the other agents monitor him. Speci cally, x a set of tasks that fail inspection, and suppose
the agent considers completing an additional task. For monitoring realizations in which that task
is monitored, he reduces the number of tasks that fail inspection. For monitoring realizations in
which that task is not monitored, he does not aﬀect how many tasks fail or pass inspection. erefore the agent’s incentives under a contract that depends on both failed and passed inspections
can be replicated by a contract that, conditional on failed inspections, oﬀers the same sanction
regardless of passed inspections, where the sanctioning scheme is set to oﬀer the same expected
sanctioning scheme as the original contract.
(Part 3) Suppose to the contrary that there is an optimal contract in which, when A ⊆ Pi tasks
are feasible, an agent is supposed to complete si (A) ⊂ A tasks, but is indiﬀerent between com31

pleting si (A) tasks and completing A′ ⊆ A tasks, with |A′ | > |si (A)|. But then there exists a
superior contract, otherwise unchanged, in which he simply completes A′ tasks whenever A tasks
are feasible—he is no worse oﬀ himself, and his team members are strictly better oﬀ.
(Part 4) By revealed preference, si (si (A)) = si (A), so it suﬃces to show that A ⊂ A′ implies
|si (A)| ≤ |si (A′ )|. Suppose to the contrary that A ⊂ A′ and |si (A)| > |si (A′ )|. Since upward
incentive constraints are slack, the agent must strictly prefer s(A′ ) over s(A). Furthermore, by
revealed preference, si (A′ ) ⊈ si (A). But then a superior contract can be constructed by slightly
relaxing the sanctions when tasks in si (A′ )\si (A) fail inspection. e agent, facing a strictly milder
sanctioning scheme, is strictly better oﬀ. For a suﬃciently small relaxation of the sanctioning
scheme, incentive compatibility still holds.
We now introduce some notation and lemmas, allowing the monitoring technology to be
imperfect: an uncompleted task fails inspection with probability γ ∈ (0, 1]. Let the number of
monitoring slots used to monitor agent i be Fi , and the number of agent i’s promises be pi . If agent
i ful lls x of promises, and tasks are drawn uniformly for monitoring, then the probability agent
i will have y failed inspections is given by the compound hypergeometric-binomial distribution
g(y, x) =

∑F i
k=y

(p −x)(
i

k

x
Fi −k

(p )
i
Fi

)

(k)
y

γ y (1 − γ)k−y .

(11)

To interpret Eq. 11, observe that in order to discover y unful lled promises of agent i, the monitor(s) must have drawn k ≥ y promises from the pi − x promises agent i failed to ful ll, and
Fi − k promises from the x promises agent i ful lled; this is described by a hypergeometric distribution. Of these k promises, the monitor(s) must then identify exactly y failed inspections; this
is described by a binomial distribution. is distribution is studied by Johnson and Kotz (1985)
and shown by Stefanski (1992) to have a monotone likelihood ratio property: g(y, x)/g(y, x − 1) <
g(y − 1, x)/g(y − 1, x − 1) for all x, y. Hence an increase in the number of tasks completed yields
a rst-order stochastic improvement in the number of unful lled promises discovered.
Lemma 2. Promise keeping is optimally implemented by a linear contract with N−2 agents making
M promises and two partial supervisors each monitoring one slot and making M − 1 promises.
Proof. Let Pi be the set of promises made by agent i and pi = |Pi |. By incentive-compatibility, to
ensure that Pi rather than a ⊂ Pi promises are ful lled when Pi are feasible, we need hvi (A) ≤
hvi (Pi ) + (pi − |A|)( Nb − c), where hvi (·) is the expected sanction conditional on the set of tasks
completed. is means that hvi (A) can be at best (pi − |A|)( Nb − c). We claim this can be achieved
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as in the statement of the lemma. Suppose each of two supervisors (agents N − 1 and N) monitor
F tasks. We divide the entire set of agents into two, each assigned to a diﬀerent supervisor’s
responsibility for monitoring (clearly each supervisor must be assigned to the group of the other
supervisor). Each supervisor randomizes uniformly over which of their agents to monitor, and
then uniformly over which task of that agent to monitor. Let Ni be the number of agents in the
group to which i belongs. Penalties depend on the number y of failed inspections. Let agent i’s
p

sanctioning scheme be vi (y) = Ni y γFi ( Nb − c), so that
hvi (A) =

∑F
1 ∑F
p b
b
vi (y)g(y, |A|) = i ( − c)
yg(y, |A|) = (pi − |A|)( − c)
y=0
y=0
Ni
γF N
N

because the expectation of the compound hypergeometric-binomial is (pi − |a|) γF
p . Conditional
i

expected sanctions are independent of F, for F ≥ 1. is contract gives expected social utility
∑N ∑M ( )
p

b
λx (1 − λ)pi −x [(b − c)x + (pi − x)( − c)]
i=1
x=0
N
∑pi ( )
∑M ( )
(b
) ∑N
pi x
pi x
pi −x
= N −c
b
λ (1 − λ)pi −x x
pi
λ (1 − λ)
+ N−1
N
x
x=0 x
i=1
x=0
(
) ∑N
b
= N−1
pi . (12)
N bλ + N − c
i

x

i=1

is is positive if λ >

c− Nb
N−1
b
N

and largest when the maximal number of promises are made, using

F = 1 for each of the two supervisors: pi = M for i = 1, 2, . . . , N−2 and pN−1 = pN = M−1.
Lemma 3. Consider a sanctioning scheme vi where agent i promises M tasks, with F < M uniformly
monitored. If vi (y) = 0 for y < F and vi (F) < 0 then a cutoﬀ strategy is implemented, with agent
i’s contribution to the social welfare given by
∑M ( )
M
x=0

x

(
)
b
(
∗} )
(c
−
)g
F,
min{x,
p
i
N
λ (1 − λ)M−x (b − c) min{x, p∗i } +
g(F, p∗i ) − g(F, p∗i − 1)
x

(13)

when the cutoﬀ p∗i is induced. e value of Eq. 13 is strictly increasing and concave in λ. Moreover,
if p∗i < p̃∗i ≤ M − F + 1, the value of Eq. 13 for p̃∗i strictly single crosses the value of Eq. 13 for p∗i

from below, as a function of λ.
Proof of Lemma 3. at a cutoﬀ strategy is induced follows from eorem 4. Eq. 13 follows from
choosing F to make the incentive constraint for doing p∗i versus p∗i − 1 tasks bind. Let β(x) ≡
(b − c) min{x, p∗i } +

(c− Nb )g(F,min{x,p∗i })
g(F,p∗ )−g(F,p∗ −1)

e value of Eq. 13 is the expectation of β(x) with respect
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to the binomial distribution over x. For any cutoﬀ, the rst term is concave.
e second term of
(
)/(M)
F M−min{x,p∗i }
∗
β(a) is a negative constant times g(F, min{x, pi }) = λ
F , which is convex:
F
(M−min{x+1,p∗ })
F

i

−2

(M−min{x,p∗ })
i

F

+

(M−min{x−1,p∗ })
i

F(
)
)(
F
F

 M−x

M−(x+1)−F − M−x
( F
(M−p∗ )
M−(p∗i −1))
i
=
−
F
F



0

if x ≤ p∗i − 1,
if x = p∗i ,

(14)

if x ≥ p∗i + 1.

which is positive because F ≥ 1, and M − p∗i + 1 ≥ F. Hence β(x) is concave. Finally, the binomial
distribution satis es double-crossing, since
) ( )
(
(
)
)
∂ 2 ((M) x
M−x
M−2−x x−2 2
λ
(1
−
λ)
= M
λ
x − 1 + 2(M − 1)λ x + M(M − 1)λ2
x
x (1 − λ)
2
∂λ
(
)
is negative if and only if x2 − 1 + 2(M − 1)λ x + M(M − 1)λ2 < 0. Hence by Lemma 4, Eq. 13 is
concave in λ. To see that Eq. 13 is increasing in λ, observe that the bene t of each task is linear in
x, increasing in p∗i and independent of λ, which is a parameter of rst-order stochastic dominance
for the binomial distribution. e expected sanction for completing min{x, p∗i } tasks is
(c − Nb )g(F, min{x, p∗i })
.
g(F, p∗i ) − g(F, p∗i − 1)

(15)

Since λ cancels out of the above, we need only check that this expression has increasing diﬀerences
in x and p∗i (by Corollary 10 of Van Zandt and Vives, 2007). Let us denote a p∗i -cutoﬀ strategy by
sp∗i . Since c −

b
N

> 0, the sign of the second diﬀerence depends on

g(F, sp∗i +1 (x + 1)) − g(F, sp∗i +1 (x)) g(F, sp∗i (x + 1)) − g(F, sp∗i (x))
−
g(F, p∗i + 1) − g(F, p∗i )
g(F, p∗i ) − g(F, p∗i − 1)



0


= 1



g(F,x+1)−g(F,x)
 g(F,x+1)−g(F,x)
∗
∗ −
∗
∗
g(F,pi +1)−g(F,pi )

g(F,pi )−g(F,pi −1)

if x ≥ p∗i + 1
if x = p∗i

(16)

if x ≤ p∗i − 1.

Concentrating on the third case, since g(F, x) is decreasing in x, it suﬃces to show that
(M−p∗ )
F

i

−

(M−p∗ +1)
i

F

>

(M−p∗ +1)
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i

F

−

(M−p∗ +2)
i

F

.

(17)

But this is exactly analogous to the earlier calculation.
Proof of eorem 3. (Part 1) is is clear from the discussion in the text.
(Parts 2 and 3) ese follow from Lemma 2.
(Part 4) When N = 2, eorem 2 on complete monitoring applies. We henceforth consider
the case N > 2. By the De Moivre–Laplace theorem (Johnson, Kemp, and Kotz, 2005, Eq. 3.20),
the normal distribution with mean pλ and variance p(1 − λ)λ approximates the binomial distribution with p tasks each with λ probability of being feasible. e approximation error in the CDF
√
at any point is no greater than the order of pλ(1 − λ). Using this approximation, we de ne the
continuous problem of choosing promises p̃i ∈ R and earnest promises p̃∗i ∈ R to solve
∑n

max

{p̃i ,p̃∗i ∈R}N
i=1

i=1

s.t.

p̃∗i

(
)
(
)
E (b − c) min{a, p̃∗i } + Nb − c max{p̃∗i − a, 0}

≤ p̃i ≤ M for all i and

∑
i

(18)

p̃i ≤ M(N − 1),

(
)
where expectation of p̃∗i is taken with respect to the normal distribution N p̃i λ, p̃i (1 − λ)λ . We
(
)
∑
write the objective function as i Ei , where Ei ≡ E (b−c) min{a, p̃∗i }+( Nb −c) max{p̃∗i −a, 0} .
First, we solve the inner part of the continuous problem—optimizing p̃∗i given p̃i . e rst order
condition is
∂Ei
∂p̃∗i

where erf(z) ≡

√2
π

∫z
0

=

1
2N

(

( λp̃ −p̃∗ ))
b + bN − 2cN + b(N − 1) erf √ i i
= 0,
2p̃(1−λ)λ

(19)

e−t dt. e rst order condition is solved at
2

p̃∗i = P̃∗ (p̃i ) ≡ p̃i λ −

√

2p̃i (1 − λ)λ erf −1

( b+bN−2cN )
b−bN

,

(20)

and the welfare arising from each agent i is
p̃i λ(c − b) −

2

−1 b+bN−2cN
be−erf ( b−bN ) N−1
N

√

p̃i λ(1−λ)
.
2π

(21)

e strict second order condition is satis ed globally:
∂ 2 Ei
∂(p̃∗i )2

= −be

−

2
(λp̃i −p̃∗
i )
2p̃(1−λ)λ

N−1
N

√

1
2πp̃(1−λ)λ

< 0.

(22)

We now move to the outer part of the continuous problem: choosing pi . By the envelope
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theorem,

the closed form of d

(

)

∂Ei
d2 Ei
∂ 2 Ei
∂ 2 Ei dP̃∗
∂p̃i p̃∗i =P̃∗ (p̃i ) and dp̃2i p̃∗i =P̃∗ (p̃i ) = ∂p̃2i + ∂pi ∂p̃∗i dp̃i p̃∗i =P̃∗ (p̃i ) .
Ei /dp2i at p̃∗i = P̃∗ (p̃i ) shows the objective is strictly convex in each

dEi
dp̃i p̃∗i =P̃∗ (p̃i )
2

=

d2 Ei
dp2i p̃∗i =P̃∗ (p̃i )

=

1
be−erf
4p̃2i

−1 b+bN−2cN 2
N−bN

(

)

√
N−1
N

p̃i λ(1−λ)
2π

Solving
p̃i :
(23)

> 0.

Since in addition dEi /dp̃i > 0 at p̃∗i = P̃∗ (p̃i ), and M units of monitoring requires

∑

i p̃i

≤

(N−1)M, it follows that the optimal promise scheme in the continuous problem is for N−1 agents
each to promise p̃i = M tasks and complete p̃∗ ≡ P̃∗ (M), while the Nth agent promises zero tasks
(i.e., only monitors). Now we construct a contract for the true (discrete) model, using the same
promise scheme: N − 1 agents each make M promises, while one agent supervises. e number
of earnest promises must be an integer, so we round p̃∗ up to the next integer, ⌈p̃∗ ⌉. Let V̂ be the
welfare attained by this discrete contract, and let Ṽ be the value of the continuous problem. e
diﬀerence V̂ − Ṽ arises from four issues.
1. e “tail bene t”: e discrete contract applies to a distribution with a lower bound of zero
feasible tasks, and so does not involve the harsh sanctions that arise in the long lower tail
of the continuous problem.
2. e “integer bene t”: e maximum number of tasks accomplished is greater under the
discrete contract than in the solution to the continuous problem, leading to higher social
payoﬀs for realizations with many feasible tasks.
3. e “integer de cit”: Because only whole tasks can be performed under the discrete contract, when fewer than ⌈p̃∗ ⌉ tasks are performed the actual sanctions may be harsher than
in the solution to the continuous problem.
4. Approximation error: e CDF of the normal distribution at a+ 12 is only an approximation
of the binomial CDF at a.
Let δ =

N−1
N b

and ρ = (b − c). Let Φ and φ be the CDF and PDF of the normal distribution,

and Φ̂ and φ̂ be the CDF and PDF of the binomial. e tail bene t (which is not aﬀected by
approximation error) is
∫
X=−

−1/2 (

−∞

)
(δ − ρ)(⌈p̃∗ ⌉ − p̃∗ ) + δa φ(a) da.

(24)

e integer bene t, accounting for approximation error, is at least
Y=ρ

((

)
(
) )
1 − Φ̂(⌈p̃∗ ⌉ − 1) ⌈p̃∗ ⌉ − 1 − Φ(⌈p̃∗ ⌉ − 12 ) p̃∗ .
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(25)

e integer de cit, accounting for approximation error, is
Z=

∑⌈p̃∗ ⌉−1 (∫
a=0

a+1/2 (

)
)
(δ − ρ)(⌈p̃∗ ⌉ − p̃∗ ) + δã φ(ã) dã − δaφ̂(a) .

(26)

a−1/2

Combining terms and collecting (⌈p̃∗ ⌉ − p̃∗ ) yields the de cit in welfare yielded by each of the
N−1 task-performing agents under the discrete contract, compared to the value of the continuous
problem:
−

1
N−1 (V̂

(
)
− Ṽ) = Z − X − Y = −(⌈p̃∗ ⌉ − p̃∗ ) ρ − δΦ(⌈p̃∗ ⌉ − 12 )
(
)
− ρ Φ(⌈p̃∗ ⌉ − 12 ) − Φ̂(⌈p̃∗ ⌉ − 1) ⌈p̃∗ ⌉
∫
∑⌈p̃∗ ⌉−1
−
δaφ̂(a) +
a=0

⌈p̃∗ ⌉−1/2
−∞

δaφ(a) da (27)

Notice that the right hand side of the rst line is bounded by [ρ − δ, ρ] regardless of p̃∗ , while
second and third lines are on the order of p̃∗ times the approximation error between Φ and Φ̂.
By the De Moivre–Laplace theorem, the approximation error is on the order of M−1/2 . Since by
Eq. 20 and Eq. 21 both p̃∗ and the value of the continuous problem are on the order of M, the ratio
of the welfare under the discrete contract and the value of the continuous problem converges to 1
as M → ∞. Consider the true optimal contract in the discrete problem, and let pi be the number

of promises and p∗i be the number of earnest promises of each agent i. e value of this contract

can be approximated by evaluating the objective of the continuous problem at pi + 12 and p∗i + 12 .
By a similar argument, the de cit per agent of this approximation compared to the true value of
the optimal discrete contract is no more than

 (
) ∗
∗
∗
1
γ
Φ(⌈p̃
⌉
−
)
−
Φ̂(⌈p̃
⌉
−
1)
⌈p̃
⌉
2
∑ 

1
∫ ⌈p̃∗ ⌉−1/2
∑⌈p̃∗ ⌉−1
,

N
i
+
δaφ̂(a) −
δaφ(a) da
a=0

(28)

−∞

which is on the order of M1/2 . erefore the ratio of V̂ and the value of true optimal contract
converges to 1 as M → ∞.
(Part 5) First observe that at λ = 1, in every optimal contract each of N − 2 agents must
promise M tasks, and two partial supervisors each promise M − 1 tasks, with all agents ful lling
all of them. e contract must impose harsh enough sanctions to make it incentive compatible
for them to do so, but the sanctions may be arbitrarily severe since they are not realized on the
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equilibrium path. e value of any such contract is (NM − 2)(b − c). Consider xed M, b, and c.
e value of a contract is continuous in λ, P, s, and v. Without loss of generality, X can be taken
to be nite, with at least NM tasks. en both P and s are de ned on compact spaces, and v can
without loss of generality take values from the extended non-positive real numbers [−∞, 0]. Since
the IR and IC constraints are weak inequalities that are continuous in λ, b, c, P, v, and s, the constraint set is compact-valued for each λ, b, and c. Finally, the constraint set is nonempty because
it always contains the contract in which no tasks are promised and no sanctions are imposed.
erefore, by Berge’s eorem of the Maximum (Aliprantis and Border, 2006, eorem 17.31),
the value of an optimal contract is continuous in λ and the correspondence mapping λ to the set of
optimal contracts (v, s, and ρ) is upper hemicontinuous. Hene as λ → 1, the value of the contract
must converge to (NM − 2)(b − c), and so must have the same number of promises per agent
as above for λ suﬃciently high. To minimize the cost of sanctions, all the downward constraints
for completing that number of promises should bind, which is achieved by a linear contract with
uniform randomization over monitored tasks. Finally, given a linear contract, s(A) = A for all A
is optimal. Now apply Lemma 2.
Next, we show that empty promises with M units of monitoring are strictly better than promisekeeping at λ∗ =
∗

cN−b
(N−1)b ,

and thus (by continuity) for an open neighborhood. First, since c < b <

cN, λ ∈ (0, 1). Now consider a contract in which one agent devotes M units of capacity to monitoring while N − 1 agents each make M promises and keep M − 1 promises. e value of promise
(
)
∗
b
keeping, (MN − 2) N−1
N bλ + N − c , is zero at λ . e value of this single-supervisor contract is
(
(
)
(N − 1) (M − 1) Nb − c +

N−1
N b

)
a
m−a
λ
(1
−
λ)
min{a,
M
−
1}
a=0 a
(
)
(
)
M
= (N − 1) (M − 1) Nb − c + N−1
b(Mλ
−
λ
)
. (29)
N

∑M ( )
M

= λ∗ . By Descartes’ Rule of Signs, the only real
(
)
d Mλ−λM
M
= λ are λ = 0 and λ = 1, and that dλ
= M−1
> 1. ese facts
M−1
λ=0

is expression is zero at the solution to
roots of

M

Mλ−λ
M−1

Mλ−λM
M−1

imply the solution λ̂ to Eq. 29 satis es λ̂ < λ∗ . Since the contract’s value strictly increases in λ,
empty promises with a single supervisor dominates promise keeping on a neighborhood of λ∗ .
By single crossing, this is also the case on [0, λ∗ ].
Finally, we show that when
keeping for λ =

M−2
M−1 ,

c
b

>

2
e+2

e
+ N1 e+2
, empty promises are strictly better than promise

and thus (by continuity) for an open neighborhood. Scale the promise-

keeping contract with minimal monitoring by 2(N − 2) to account for the probability of being
monitored, we employ a maximally forgiving contract against each of the N − 2 workers which
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enforces a cutoﬀ p∗ as in Lemma 3. Combining Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, and applying F = 2, the
social value of this contract when the cutoﬀ is p∗ is
(
2(M − 1) N−1
N bλ +

b
N

)
− c + (N − 2)




min{a, p∗ }(b − c)
 (30)
λa (1 − λ)M−a 
b
−c (M−min{a,p∗ })
a=0
N
+ M−p∗
2

∑M

By Lemma 3 this is a single-crossing family and the optimal p∗ increases with λ. Note that the
∑
a
M−a a2 = Mλ(1− λ)+(Mλ)2 . When p∗ = M−1,
binomial term is quadratic, and M
a=0 λ (1− λ)
(
)
the binomial in the second term of Eq. 30 may be replaced with M−a
and Eq. 30 reduces to
2
)
(
(
)
(b
) M(M − 1)(1 − λ)2
M
N−1
b
2(M − 1) N bλ + N − c + (N − 2) (Mλ − λ )(b − c) + N − c
. (31)
2
Simplifying terms and factoring, Eq. 31 dominates promise-keeping when
(
)
(
)
2N(Mλ − λM )(b − c) + (b − cN) M(M − 1)(1 − λ)2 > 2M (N − 1)bλ + b − cN
(
) (
)
⇐⇒ 2NλM (c − b) − 2Mλ cN + (N − (N − 1))b > 2M − M(M − 1)(1 − λ)2 (b − cN)
⇐⇒ 2(b − c)λM N < (1 − λ)(M − λ(M − 1) − 3)M(b − cN).
(32)
e last LHS in Eq. 32 is positive, so the RHS must be positive too, for Eq. 32 to hold. So b < cN
means M − λ(M − 1) − 3 < 0. For λ∗ =

M−2
M−1 ,

Eq. 32 is

(
)M
2(b − c) M−2
N<
M−1

M
M−1 (cN

− b).

(33)

M
e RHS of Eq. 33 is bounded below by cN − b. Consider zM = ( M−2
M−1 ) . Taking logarithms,

−M2
(M−2)(M−1) = −1, hence
Eq. 33 is then bounded above by 2(b−c)N
, and a suﬃcient
e
c
2
1 e
− b, which rearranges to b > e+2 + N e+2 .

ln zM = M ln M−2
M−1 . Using l’Hôpital’s rule, limM→∞ ln zM = limM→∞
zM →

1
e

from below. e LHS of

condition for Eq. 33 is

Appendix B

2(b−c)N
e

< cN

Optimal convex contracts (for online publication only)

In this supplemental appendix we consider contracts that are symmetric with respect to task
names and for which the amount of monitoring to be accomplished (denoted F) is public. In this
case, the sanction depends on the number of failures f of inspection, where f ∈ {0, 1, . . . , F}.
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Within this class, contracts which deliver increasingly large sanctions for larger numbers of inspection failures may be a focal class to consider. Such decreasing convex (DC) contracts satisfy
the restriction v(f) − v(f + 1) ≥ v(f − 1) − v(f) ≥ 0. Convex contracts may be natural in settings where sanctions are imposed by third parties who are more inclined to exact sanctions if
they perceive a consistent pattern of failures. Conversely, a non-convex contract may be particularly diﬃcult to enforce via an aﬀected third party, since it would require leniency on the margin
for relatively large injuries. For arbitrary memory size M, we show that DC contracts optimally
induce task-completion strategies that have a cutoﬀ form. Furthermore, the optimal such contract forgives empty promises up to some failure threshold, and increases the sanction linearly
thereafter.
eorem 4. For any M, cutoﬀ strategies with a kinked linear sanctioning scheme are optimal in
the class of DC contracts.
We rst prove several lemmas. e rst provides a suﬃcient condition on a one-parameter
family of probability distributions for the expectation of a concave function to be concave in the
parameter. ough it can be derived from a theorem of Fishburn (1982), we provide a simpler statement of the condition along with a more direct proof. We say that a function ψ :
{0, 1, . . . , R} → R is concave if ψ(r + 1) − ψ(r) ≤ ψ(r) − ψ(r − 1) for all r = 1, . . . , R − 1.
A function φ : Z → R, where Z ⊆ R, is double crossing if there is a (possibly empty) convex set
{
}
A ⊂ R such that A ∩ Z = z ∈ Z : φ(z) < 0 .
Lemma 4. Let R = {0, 1, . . . , R}, and let {qz }z∈Z be a collection of probability distributions on
∑
R parameterized by z ∈ Z = {0, 1, . . . , Z}.²¹ e function Ψ(z) = Rr=0 ψ(r)qz (r) is concave if
1. ere exists k, c ∈ R, k ̸= 0, such that z = k

∑R

r=0 rqz (r)

+ c for all z ∈ Z;

2. qz+1 (r) − 2qz (r) + qz−1 (r) for all z = 1, . . . , Z − 1, as a function of r, is double crossing;
3. ψ : {0, 1, . . . , R} → R is concave.
Proof. Since z = k

∑R

r=0 rqz (r) + c, there exists b̂

∈ R such that

∑R

r=0 (mr + b)qz (r)

=

m
k z + b̂ + c

for any real m and b. Hence, for any m and b,
∑R

)
(
) m(
z + 1 − 2z + z − 1 = 0,
(mr + b) qz+1 (r) − 2qz (r) + qz−1 (r) =
r=0
k

²¹A similar result holds if z ∈ Z = [0, 1].
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(34)

for all z = 1, . . . , Z − 1. erefore, for any m and b, the second diﬀerence of Ψ(z) is
∑R

(
)
ψ(r) qz+1 (r) − 2qz (r) + qz−1 (r)
r=0
∑R (
)(
)
=
ψ(r) − mr − b qz+1 (r) − 2qz (r) + qz−1 (r) . (35)

Ψ(z + 1) − 2Ψ(z) + Ψ(z − 1) =

r=0

By assumption, qz+1 (r) − 2qz (r) + qz−1 (r), as a function of r, is double crossing. Furthermore,
(
)
since ψ is concave, we can choose m and b such that, wherever qz+1 (r) − 2qz (r) + qz−1 (r) or
∂2
q (r)
∂z2 z

is nonzero, ψ(r) − mr − b either has the opposite sign or is zero. From Eq. 35 we may

conclude Ψ(z) is concave.
e next lemma says that expected sanctioning scheme will be decreasing convex in the number of tasks completed. Recall the de nition of g(f, a) from Eq. 11.
∑
Lemma 5. If v is decreasing convex, then hv ≡ Ff=0 v(f)g(f, ·) is decreasing convex.
()
Proof. By letting a ≡ |A|, reversing the order of summation, and using fact that kf = 0 when
k < f, we can write hv (A) as follows:
hv (A) =
=
=

∑F
f=0

∑F
f=0

g(f, a)v(f)
(p−a)( a )
(∑F
)
()
k
(p)F−k kf γ f (1 − γ)k−f v(f)

∑F

k=0

(p−a)(

k=0

k

)

a
F−k

(p)

F

(∑F ( )
k
f=0

F

f

(36)

)
γ f (1 − γ)k−f v(f) .

erefore, the expectation is rst with respect to the binomial, and then with respect to the hypergeometric. Using Lemma 4 twice gives the result. First, note that the expectation of the binomial
is γk, a linear function of k, while the expectation of the hypergeometric is Fp (p − a), a linear function of a. Hence it suﬃces to show that the binomial second-diﬀerence in k is double-crossing
in f (hence the inside expectation is decreasing convex in k) and the hypergeometric seconddiﬀerence in a is double-crossing in k. To see this is true for the binomial, note that we may write
the binomial second-diﬀerence in k as
(k)
f

γ f (1 − γ)k−f

( (k+1)(1−γ)
k+1−f

−2+

k−f )
k(1−γ) .

(37)

It can be shown that the term in parentheses is strictly convex in f and therefore double crossing
in f, so the whole expression is double-crossing in f. To see this is true for the hypergeometric,
41

note that we may write the hypergeometric second-diﬀerence in a as
(p−a)(
k

a
F−k

( p)

)

(

p−a−k
p−a

·

a+1
a+1−F+k

−2+

p−a+1
p−a+1−k

·

a−F+k
a

)
.

(38)

F

It can be shown that the term in parentheses has either no real roots or exactly two real roots.²² If
there are no real roots, then the term in parentheses is double-crossing in k (recall that the region
in which it is negative must be convex, but may be empty), and therefore the whole expression is
double-crossing in k. If there are two real roots, it can be shown that the derivative with respect
to k is negative at the smaller root, and that therefore both the term in parentheses and the whole
expression are double-crossing in k.
Proof of eorem 4. Fix any p, F, λ. Suppose strategy s, with p∗ > 0 the maximal number of tasks
completed, is optimal. Consider the decreasing convex contract v that implements s at minimum
cost. Because v is decreasing, MLRP (or FOSD in a) implies the expected sanction decreases in the
number of completed tasks: h(a) > h(a − 1) for all a. By contradiction, suppose the downward
constraint for p∗ versus p∗ − 1 is slack: h(p∗ ) − h(p∗ − 1) > c − b. By Lemma 5 and monotonicity,
for any k > 1, h(p∗ − k + 1) − h(p∗ − k) > c − b. But then for any a with s(a) = a, and every
∑a−1
′
a′ < a, the downward constraint h(a) − h(a′ ) = k=a
′ h(k + 1) − h(k) ≥ (a − a )(c − b) is
slack. Some constraint must bind at the optimum, else the strategy is implementable for free, so
the downward constraint for p∗ versus p∗ − 1 must bind. Again, each downward constraint is
satis ed, and for any a > p∗ , h(a) − h(p∗ ) < (a − p∗ )(c − b). So the strategy s is a p∗ -cutoﬀ.
Suppose we look for the optimal convex contract with p promises, F monitoring slots, and
cutoﬀ strategy s with cutoﬀ p∗ . By the above, the only binding incentive constraint is the downward constraint for completing p∗ promises. Since v(0) = 0, convexity implies monotonicity.
e constraint v(0) ≥ 0 does not bind,²³ so the cost minimization problem in primal form is
max

(−v)≥⃗0

∑F (
f=0

∑F
f=0

−(−v(f))

∑p
a=0

)
−g(f, a)ts (a) subject to

(−v(f))[g(f, p∗ ) − g(f, p∗ − 1)] ≤ −(c − b),

(39)

2(−v(f)) − (−v(f + 1)) − (−v(f − 1)) ≤ 0 for all f = 1, . . . , F − 1,
²²e term in parentheses does not account for the fact that the entire expression equals zero whenever k > p − a
or F − k > a. However, on the closure of these regions the second diﬀerence cannot be negative, and so these regions
may be ignored.
²³Although v(0) ≥ 0 is satis ed with equality, the binding constraint on v(0) is actually v(0) ≤ 0.
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where ts (a) =

∑p

a′ =a I

(

)( ) ′
′
s(a′ ) = a ap′ λa (1 − λ)p−a denotes the probability of completing a

tasks given task-completion strategy s.
Let x be the Lagrange multiplier for the incentive compatibility constraint, zf the multiplier for
the convexity constraint 2(−v(f)) − (−v(f + 1)) − (−v(f − 1)) ≤ 0, and⃗z the vector (z1 , . . . , zF−1 ).
e constraint set can be written as A⊤ · (−v(0), . . . , −v(F)), where, in sparse form,





A=






g(0, p∗ ) − g(0, p∗ − 1) −1

..
.

.
2 ..


..
..
. −1 
.
−1
.

..
..

.
.
2 
g(F, p∗ ) − g(F, p∗ − 1)
−1

(40)

Let r be the vector of dual variables: r = (x, z1 , . . . , zF−1 ). e dual problem is
min (b − c)x
r≥⃗0

s.t. (Ar)f ≥ −

∑p
a=0

g(f, a)ts (a) for all f = 0, 1, . . . , F,

(41)

where (Ar)f is the (f)th component of A · r; i.e.,
(Ar)f = x[g(f, p∗ ) − g(f, p∗ − 1)] − zf−1 + 2zf − zf+1 ,

(42)

where we de ne z0 ≡ 0, zF ≡ 0, and zF+1 ≡ 0. Let f̂ be the smallest f with v(f) < 0. It must be
∑p
that v(f) < 0 for all f ≥ f̂, so by duality, (A · r)f ≥ − a=0 g(f, a)ts (a) binds for all f ≥ f̂. Hence
∑p
x=

a=0 g(f, a)ts (a) − zf−1 + 2zf
g(f, p∗ − 1) − g(f, p∗ )

− zf+1

for all f = f̂, . . . , F.

(43)

In particular, this means that if zF−1 = 0 (which is implied when f̂ = F) the optimal contract
(which would have expected sanction −x(c − b)) has the same value as that derived in Lemma 3),
completing the claim. In the remainder we assume zF−1 > 0.
e sum of the z-terms over (A · r)F−1 and (A · r)F is −zF−1 + (2zF−1 − zF−2 ) = zF−1 − zF−2 .
Note also the corresponding sum of z-terms over F − 2, F − 1, and F: −zF−1 + (2zF−1 − zF−2 ) +
(−zF−3 + 2zF−2 − zF−1 ) = zF−2 − zF−3 . Iterating, the sum of the z-terms in (A · r)f from any f̃ ≥ f̂
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to F is zf̃ − zf̃−1 . Summing the equalities in Eq. 43 thus yields a recursive system for zf̃ , f̃ = f̂, . . . , F:
zf̃ = zf̃−1 −

∑F ∑p
f=f̃

a=0

g(f, a)ts (a) + x

∑F (
f=f̃

)
g(f, p∗ − 1) − g(f, p∗ ) .

(44)

By de nition, the convexity constraint is slack at f̂ − 1, so zf̂−1 = 0. By induction, for f′ = f̂, . . . , F,
zf ′

=

−

∑f′ ∑F ∑p
f̃=f̂

f=f̃

a=0

g(f, a)ts (a) + x

∑f′ ∑F (
f̃=f̂

f=f̃

)
g(f, p∗ − 1) − g(f, p∗ ) . (45)

Plugging this equation for f′ = F into the binding constraint (Ar)F ≥ −

∑p

a=0 g(F, a)ts (a)

pro-

vides solution for x in terms of f̂:
∑F ∑F ∑p
f̃=f̂

a=0 g(f, a)ts (a)

f=f̃

f̃=f̂

x = ∑F ∑F (
f=f̃

g(f, p∗ − 1) − g(f, p∗ )

).

(46)

∑
e expectation of a random variable X on {0, . . . , n}, is nj=1 j Pr(X = j), which also equals
∑F ∑p
∑n
a=0 g(f, a)ts (a) = Pr(f ≥ f̃), the numerator of Eq. 46 equals
j=1 Pr(X ≥ j). Since
f=f̃
∑F ∑F ∑p
f̃=f̂

f=f̃

∑F
∑F
g(f, a)ts (a) =
Pr(f ≥ f̃) =
(f̃ − f̂ + 1) Pr(f = f̃)
a=0
f̃=f̂
f̃=f̂
∑F
]
[
=
(f̃ − f̂ + 1)+ Pr(f = f̃) = E (f − f̂ + 1)+ ≡ E[φ(f̂)], (47)
f̃=1

where (y)+ ≡ max{y, 0} and φ is the random function φ(f̂) ≡ (f − f̂ + 1)+ . In words, φ(f̂) is
the number of discovered unful lled promises that exceed the threshold for sanctions (f̂). e
denominator of Eq. 46 can be rewritten similarly, yielding
x=

E[φ(f̂)]
E[ φ(f̂) | a =

p∗

− 1 ] − E[ φ(f̂) | a = p∗ ]

.

(48)

e minimized expected sanction is E[v(f)] = (b − c)x, and hence is implemented by the kinkedlinear sanctioning scheme
v(f) = −

(c − b)(f − f̂ + 1)+
E[ φ(f̂) | a = p∗ − 1 ] − E[ φ(f̂) | a = p∗ ]
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for all f = 0, 1, . . . , F.

(49)

